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Abstract 
To bridge the related but separate areas of research on mind-wandering and Involuntary 
Autobiographical Memory (IAM), the frequency and temporal focus of task unrelated 
thoughts about past, present, and future was compared in 19 dysphoric and 21 non-dysphoric 
participants, using a modified laboratory method for studying IAMs. Participants were 
stopped 11 times during a 15-minute vigilance task and recorded their thoughts at that 
moment. In both groups, most thoughts were spontaneous, task-unrelated, and triggered by 
irrelevant cue-words on the screen with negative words being more likely to trigger past 
memories and positive cues - thoughts about future. Both groups reported more past 
memories than current or future thoughts, but differences emerged in the type of future 
thought experienced: non-dysphoric participants reported more planning thoughts, and 
dysphoric participants more abstract hypothetical thoughts. The results suggest that some 
findings from IAM research regarding cues and the impact of dysphoria may be generalizable 
to mind-wandering. 
Keywords:  dysphoria, mind-wandering, involuntary autobiographical memory, future 
thinking, prospection, planning 
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1. Introduction 
Mind-wandering has been referred to as task unrelated thought (Giambra, 1989), task 
unrelated images and thoughts (Giambra, 1993, 1995) or stimulus-independent thought 
(Teasdale et al., 1995) among other names (see Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Everyday 
examples range from fantasising about a luxury yacht voyage whilst stirring soup to ‘zoning-
out’ when reading a boring text (Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2004; Singer, 1976).  
One of the key characteristics of the phenomenon involves ‘decupling’ from one’s 
immediate environment, or “a shift in the focus of attention away from the here and now 
towards one’s private thoughts and feelings” (Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery & Obonsawin, 
2007, p. 818). In addition, the incidents of mind-wandering are often unintended, i.e., they 
occur spontaneously. Sometimes people may not even be aware that their mind has wandered 
until they are stopped and asked what their thoughts were at that moment (Schooler, 2002; 
Smallwood et al., 2007). Finally, task unrelated thoughts are often considered to be stimulus 
independent, as they are thought to originate from internal rather than external sources 
(Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011). Indeed, according to 
Singer (1993), “the human condition involves a continuing tension between processing 
information generated from the physical and social milieu and the continuous operation of 
centrally generated material from long-term memory in the form of reminiscences, wishes, 
current concerns, expectations and fantasies” (p. 100). 
There is near universal agreement that mind-wandering is both common and frequent 
in everyday life with some studies suggesting that up to half of our waking lives are spent 
thinking about matters other than what is immediately before us (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 
2010). There is, however, an ongoing debate about its nature and role in mental life 
(Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; Smallwood, 2013) with some researchers arguing that mind-
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wandering represents a failure of executive control which may be detrimental to ongoing 
activities (McVay & Kane, 2010), while others suggest that it represents the redirection of 
executive resources toward internal goals when they are not required for completion of an 
external task, and may therefore have an adaptive function (Klinger, 1999; 2013; Smallwood 
& Schooler, 2006). This view is also supported by evidence showing that during mind-
wandering people are more likely to think about future plans and tasks than about current and 
past events (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011). 
Despite this tendency to prospect more often than retrospect, people do report 
thinking about the past during mind-wandering episodes (e.g., while sitting in a boring 
meeting, one may suddenly remember a skiing holiday in Switzerland). However, 
spontaneous remembering of past events without actively trying to remember anything has 
been termed Involuntary Autobiographical Memory (IAM) and studied as part of research on 
autobiographical memory with little overlap with research on mind-wandering (for 
exceptions see Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen, 2013; McVay & Kane, 2013; Vannucci, Batool, 
Pelagatti, & Mazzoni, 2014; Song & Wang, 2012). The aim of this paper is to take initial 
steps toward bringing together these two separate streams of research on mind-wandering and 
IAMs in the hope that this may provide interesting insights for both areas of research. 
If IAMs are instances of mind-wandering (cf. Johannesen & Berntsen, 2010), then one 
would expect that similar findings would be obtained in both areas of research in relation to 
several important variables. This is clearly the case with respect to the effects of attentional 
demands of ongoing tasks on the occurrence of mind-wandering and IAMs as both are less 
likely to occur with cognitively demanding rather than undemanding ongoing tasks (e.g., 
Antrobus, 1968; Berntsen, 1996; Giambra, 1995; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004; Schlagman 
& Kvavilashvili, 2008; Smallwood, Davies, Heim, Finnigan, Sudberry, O'Connor, & 
Obonsawin, 2004; Smallwood, Obonsawin & Reid, 2003). However, discrepant findings 
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have started to emerge with respect to several other variables. For example, research on 
IAMs, using both diary and laboratory methods has shown that the majority of IAMs (about 
80-94%) are elicited by easily identifiable cues that are predominantly external rather than 
internal, and related to the central aspects of the content of IAMs (e.g., seeing balloons may 
elicit a memory about a particular birthday party) (Berntsen, 1996; Mace, Bernas, & 
Clevinger, in press; Mace, 2004; Mazzoni, Vannucci, & Batool, 2014; Schlagman, 
Kvavilashvili, & Schulz, 2007). Some studies have also shown the importance of verbal cues 
(both external and internal) in eliciting IAMs (Mace, 2004; Schlagman et al., 2007; 
Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).1  
In contrast, very little is known about the cues that directly trigger mind-wandering 
episodes (but see McVay & Kane, 2013; Song & Wang, 2012), as participants are not asked 
to indicate if the thought they were having just before the probe was triggered by a particular 
cue (internal or external). Moreover, in the experience sampling study of Song and Wang 
(2012), which did query participants about the cues, it was found that although participants 
reported cues in 88% of thought probes, the percentage of internal cues (49%) was as high as 
external cues (51%), which is different from the predominance of external cues reported in 
the IAM literature (e.g., Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Schlagman et al., 2007; 
Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). 
The lack of research on triggers is surprising given that Klinger’s (1999; 2013) 
influential current concerns theory has consistently emphasised the importance of cues in 
eliciting mind-wandering. According to this theory, people’s goals and current concerns 
sensitize them towards relevant external or internal cues which, upon encountering, 
automatically re-activate the goal related material in one’s consciousness (Klinger, 1978; 
Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980). A recent laboratory study by McVay and Kane (2013) 
tested this assumption by using an on-going vigilance task with verbal cues some of which 
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were based on the pre-screened ‘current concerns’ of participants. Collecting periodic thought 
probes shortly after the appearance of personally relevant cues, McVay and Kane (2013) 
found a 3-4% increase in mind-wandering relative to controls who were exposed to cue 
words with no personal relevance. Whilst a small difference, this offers preliminary evidence 
of the importance of environmental cues in mind-wandering, and their potential link to 
unfinished goals and underlines the need for further investigation in this particular area.   
Discrepant findings have started to emerge also in relation to the temporal focus of 
task unrelated thoughts. Within mind-wandering research, there is increasing evidence in 
support of the idea that when participants report experiencing task unrelated thoughts during 
the ongoing laboratory tasks, they tend to indicate that their thoughts are more often about the 
future rather than past events (Baird et al., 2011; Smallwood, Schooler, Turk, Cunningham, 
Burns & Macrae, 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). However, evidence from naturalistic studies 
is mixed, with two recent experience-sampling studies reporting the prospective bias (Poerio, 
Totterdell, & Miles, 2013; Song & Wang, 2012) but an earlier study by Klinger and Cox 
(1987) failing to find any differences between the frequency of thoughts about the past and 
future. Moreover, in a diary study by Finnbogadóttir and Berntsen, (2013) where participants 
recorded their involuntary thoughts about the past (i.e., memories) and the future during two 
separate 1-day periods, the number of recorded IAMs (M=22.61) did not differ from the 
number of recorded future thoughts (M=21.50) (see also Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008).  
Finally, different results have been obtained in relation to the effects of mood and 
depression on task unrelated thoughts and IAMs. Within mind-wandering research, several 
studies have reported a positive relationship between frequency of mind-wandering and 
measures of negative mood and dysphoria (Murphy, Macpherson, Jeyabalasingham, Manly, 
& Dunn, 2013; Smallwood, O’Connor, & Heim, 2005; Smallwood et al., 2007; Smallwood, 
O’Connor, Sudberry, Haskell, & Ballantyne, 2004, Experiment 1; Smallwood, Davies, et al., 
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2004, Experiment 3).  In addition, Smallwood and O’Connor (2011) showed that the 
induction of negative mood increased participants’ tendency to mind-wander about their past 
rather than future. 
These findings suggest that people with dysphoria and depression should experience 
higher frequency of IAMs than non-depressed controls. However, two studies on IAMs 
addressing this issue resulted in non-significant results. In a diary study by Watson, Berntsen, 
Kuyken, and Watkins (2013) clinically depressed and non-depressed participants had to 
record 10 IAMs (with a maximum of 2 IAMs per day to reduce the burden). Results showed 
that depressed participants took significantly longer (on average 30 days) to record 10 
memories than non-depressed participants (14 days). This indicates that depressed groups did 
not experience IAMs more frequently than the non-depressed group although the possibility 
that they were less motivated to keep a diary could not be excluded. However, Kvavilashvili 
and Schlagman (2011) elicited IAMs under more controlled conditions using a laboratory 
method, developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008), and found that participants with 
stable dysphoria (with the mean of 23.76 on Beck’s Depression Inventory, range 16-42) did 
not report experiencing more frequent IAMs than non-dysphoric participants (with the mean 
depression score of 2.46, range 0-6). 
These discrepant findings could be due to some important phenomenological 
differences between task unrelated thoughts studied within mind-wandering literature and 
research on IAMs. This, however, is unlikely given the universal agreement that some task 
unrelated thoughts reported by participants in mind-wandering experiments may refer to 
one’s autobiographical past, reflected in the instructions and examples of IAMs given to 
participants in these experiments (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2011; Smallwood, Obonsawin & 
Reid, 2003). 
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An alternative and more plausible explanation for inconsistent findings emerging 
from the two separate literatures on mind-wandering and IAMs is the different methods used 
to study these phenomena. Indeed, the majority of research on mind-wandering is conducted 
in the laboratory, and participants are engaged in monotonous tasks and are intermittently 
stopped to report either the content of their thoughts at that moment, which will then be 
coded as task related or unrelated by researchers (e.g., Baird et al., 2011), or to categorise the 
thoughts as task related or unrelated without reporting the actual thought content (e.g., 
Smallwood, McSpadden, Luus & Schooler, 2008). Originally, simple vigilance tasks with 
shapes as stimuli were used (e.g., green circle) and required that participants responded to 
infrequent targets (e.g., three red squares) with a simple button press (Giambra, 1995). More 
recently, several variants of this method have been used, some of which have relatively high 
levels of cognitive demand. For example, in the Sustained Attention to Response Task 
(SART) (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997) which has been used in a 
large number of studies, participants respond continuously to non-target stimuli (mostly 
digits) by pressing a button, whilst withholding a response to an infrequent target (e.g., 
Jackson, Weinstein, & Balota, 2013; McVay & Kane, 2009, 2013; Smallwood, Davies, et al., 
2004). One reason why this task has become so popular is that it allows researchers to obtain 
behavioural indices of mind-wandering (e.g., errors of commission). Other ongoing tasks that 
have been used involve readings texts and encoding words (e.g., Reichle, Reineberg, & 
Schooler, 2010; Smallwood, O’Connor, et al., 2004). Very few studies have used more 
naturalistic methods such as thought sampling using paper and electronic diaries (Kane 
Brown, McVay, Silva, Myin-Germeys, & Kwapil, 2007; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; 
McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009; Poerio et al., 2013; Song & Wang, 2012). 
In contrast, the vast majority of research on IAMs has been conducted using diary 
methods where participants are asked to keep a diary and record IAMs as and when they 
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occur in everyday life (e.g., Berntsen, 1996; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004, Study 4; Mace, 
2005). More recently, several lab methods have been developed to capture and measure 
IAMs under controlled conditions (Ball, 2007; Mace, 2006). For example, Schlagman and 
Kvavilashvili (2008) developed a method which tries to simulate the conditions in which 
IAMs occur in everyday life (i.e., being engaged in an undemanding task and being 
surrounded by stimuli that can act as incidental triggers). To achieve this goal, participants 
are required to detect an infrequent target slide with vertical lines from hundreds of non-
target slides with horizontal lines (each presented for 1.5 seconds). In addition to lines, 
participants can see cue words in the centre of each slide (e.g. ‘friendly boss,’ ‘missed 
opportunity,’ or ‘crossing the road’), which they are told are irrelevant to the vigilance task. 
Their task is to detect slides with vertical lines, and in addition, to stop the presentation by 
button press if at any point during the task they experience an involuntary memory from their 
past (self-caught method). Results from several studies show that, on average, participants 
report 6-7 memories during the 600-800 slide long presentations (range 0 – 30), and that the 
majority of recorded IAMs are reported to be triggered by irrelevant cue words presented on 
the slides (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). 
Although there are some parallels between this task and simple vigilance or choice 
reaction tasks used in mind-wandering research, there are also clear differences, especially 
when compared to the SART. First, the number of targets is substantially lower (less than 
1%) than in the tasks used in many mind-wandering studies (10-20%). This significantly 
reduces attentional demands of the ongoing task and induces relaxed state of mind, necessary 
for mind-wandering episodes. Second, and perhaps more important, it exposes participants to 
a steady stream of stimuli (positive, negative and neutral word phrases) that can trigger IAMs 
and possibly mind-wandering episodes in general (e.g., see McVay & Kane, 2013). 
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Taken together, these important differences between the methods suggest that tasks 
used in mind-wandering research are perhaps using less optimal conditions for the occurrence 
of task unrelated thoughts than diary and laboratory methods used in the IAM research, and 
this could potentially explain the discrepant findings obtained in relation to triggers, temporal 
focus and effects of mood. 
1.1 Present Study 
To examine the role of these variables on the nature and frequency of task unrelated 
thoughts, the present study combined the mind-wandering and IAM paradigms by using a 
modified version of the method developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008). 
Specifically, dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants were engaged in a vigilance task that 
involved detecting infrequent vertical lines and being exposed to irrelevant cue words in the 
centre of each slide. However, unlike the Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) method, in 
which participants have to stop the presentation to report the occurrence of an IAM (self-
caught method), in the present study a probe caught method was used in which participants 
were stopped 11 times throughout the task and had to record their thoughts at that moment 
(cf. Vannucci et al., 2014). In addition, unlike previous studies on mind-wandering, 
participants had to report any triggers for their thoughts. At the end of the task, they classified 
the reported thoughts as either past memories, current thoughts or thoughts about the future.  
Using this method, several important questions were addressed. The first question 
concerns the role of environmental cues in triggering off task thoughts. Although research on 
IAMs provides strong evidence for the importance of external cues in eliciting involuntary 
memories, the role of cues is less clear for task unrelated thoughts in mind-wandering with 
only two empirical studies that have directly addressed this question (McVay & Kane, 2013; 
Song & Wang, 2012). Based on findings on IAMs, it was predicted that the majority of 
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thought probes, classed as task unrelated, would be reported by participants as triggered by 
cue words presented on the screen during the vigilance task. An alternative prediction derived 
from the experience sampling study of Song and Wang (2012) is that the percentage of task-
unrelated thoughts triggered by external cues would be smaller than reported in IAM studies.  
Furthermore, there has been no research on emotional valence of cues for task 
unrelated thoughts. Laboratory studies of IAMs have shown that IAMs are more likely to be 
elicited by negative than neutral or positive cues (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011; 
Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). It is unclear, however, if this pattern extends to 
spontaneous task unrelated thoughts about the future or current situation. Based on diary 
studies of Berntsen and colleagues which showed that involuntary thoughts about the future 
were rated as more positive and idyllic than IAMs (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; 
Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen, 2013), it was predicted that thought probes classed as future 
thoughts would be more likely to be reported to have positive than neutral or negative cues.   
The second research question concerns the temporal focus of task unrelated thoughts. 
Although several laboratory studies of mind-wandering have found that participants report 
experiencing thoughts about future more often than thoughts about the past (Baird et al., 
2011; Smallwood, Nind & O’Connor, 2009, Experiment 1), this prospective bias has not been 
found under all conditions, particularly those in which participants were exposed to verbal 
information, i.e., when reading texts (Smallwood et al., 2009, Experiment 2). This raises an 
interesting possibility that people have a tendency to prospect in an environment that is 
devoid of meaningful cues (e.g., words), but when such cues are present, as in case of diary 
studies of Berntsen and Jacobsen (2008) and Finnbogadóttir and Berntsen (2013), and 
experience sampling study of Klinger and Cox (1987) then this prospective bias may 
disappear. Therefore, while laboratory research on mind-wandering would expect to obtain 
the standard prospective bias in the present study, the findings from Berntsen and colleagues 
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and Smallwood et al. (2009) suggest that participants will be reporting equal numbers of 
thoughts about past and future. 
The third research question concerns the frequency and nature of mind wandering in 
dysphoria. Existing findings from mind-wandering research suggest that in the present study 
dysphoric participants would report more task unrelated thoughts than non-dysphoric 
participants. In contrast, findings on depression and IAMs (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 
2011; Watson et al., 2013) suggest that there may be no differences between the two groups. 
One possible reason for higher rates of task unrelated thoughts reported by dysphoric 
participants in some studies on mind-wandering is that fairly demanding ongoing tasks have 
been used such as the SART, encoding words, etc. Indeed, Smallwood et al. (2007) 
demonstrated increased mind-wandering in dysphoria when participants had to encode words 
for future recall but not when they had to simply shadow the words. Given that in the present 
study, a very undemanding vigilance task was used, and that Kvavilashvili and Schlagman 
(2011) did not find any group differences in the number of reported IAMs, it was predicted 
that dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants would experience equal numbers of memories, 
and by extension, present and future thoughts.      
Two additional questions were addressed in relation to dysphoria. First, mood 
congruency effects were examined by comparing participants’ pleasantness ratings of their 
recorded thoughts. In line with findings of Kvavilashvili and Schlagman (2011) on IAMs, it 
was predicted that dysphoric participants would rate both their past memories and future 
thoughts more negatively than non-dysphoric participants. Second, very few studies have 
examined the actual content of task unrelated thoughts including thoughts about the future 
(Baird et al., 2011; D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2011). However, results of a 
diary study of D’Argambeau et al. (2011), in which participants had to record 10 thoughts 
about the future over a period of 5 days, showed that the majority of recorded thoughts (70%) 
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were goal oriented and involved making decisions and planning upcoming tasks with only 
11% of thoughts classed as thoughts or daydreams with no apparent purpose (e.g., fantasies, 
wishful thinking). In the present study, we wanted to replicate and extend this finding to 
dysphoric people by conducting a content analysis of future thoughts. Given depressed 
people’s tendency to engage in abstract rumination about the causes of their symptoms 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008), it is possible that in comparison to control 
group they would be more likely to engage in abstract, hypothetical thinking about the future 
(e.g., I wish I was financially more secure) than in planning upcoming tasks (I need to buy 
some ingredients for dinner on my way home this evening). 
Finally, we examined the specificity of recorded task unrelated thoughts. Although 
there is ample evidence for over general memory in depressed people who report repetitive 
rather than specific events when voluntarily recalling autobiographical memories, 
Kvavilashvili and Schlagman (2011) showed that this effect did not generalize to IAMs. In 
their study, dysphoric people’s IAMs were as specific as those of non-dysphoric participants 
(see also Watson et al., 2013). Therefore, in the present study we examined specificity ratings 
of thoughts to see if this finding could be extended to dysphoric people’s thoughts about the 
future as well.  
2. Method  
2.1 Design 
 A quasi-experimental, mixed design compared a number of variables associated with 
recorded past, current and future thoughts (within groups factor) in dysphoric and non-
dysphoric individuals (between groups factor).  
2.2 Participants 
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University students were recruited via mass email inviting completion of an online 
mood questionnaire (the Beck Depression Inventory, (BDI); Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, 
& Erbaugh, 1961) to be considered for participation in a study on mood and concentration. 
Additional recruitment was conducted via online social networking and a human resources 
contact in a public sector organisation. Invitation to attend the laboratory session was limited 
to individuals scoring in the dysphoric (16-64) and non-dysphoric (0-9) range.2 Of the 336 
respondents to the mood questionnaire, 206 were invited to attend the laboratory session. Of 
those, 46 participants attended, but six were removed due to significant changes in their BDI 
score. The final sample therefore consisted of 40 participants, of which 19 were stable 
dysphoric (13 female) and 21 stable non-dysphoric (14 female).  Participants were asked to 
complete the mood questionnaire again at the end of laboratory session (Table 1). A mean of 
23.55 days elapsed between the first and second completions of the BDI (SD=17.83, range 6-
72), and all participants’ scores remained within the above mentioned low and high ranges 
for that period of time. The mean age of participants was 33.20 (SD=11.63, range 19-53), and 
the mean number of years in education was 16.86 (SD=2.78, range 11-23). There were no 
reliable differences between the dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups in terms of their age 
t(38)=1.27, p=0.21  or years in education t(38)=-0.38, p=0.70.  
At the beginning and the end of the vigilance task, participants were also asked to rate 
their mood on a 9-point scale (1=extremely negative, 5=neutral, 9=extremely positive). 
Dysphoric participants gave a mean mood rating of 5.47 (SD=1.81) prior to the vigilance 
task, and a mean score of 5.53 (SD=1.54) after the vigilance task, whilst non-dysphoric 
participants had a mean score of 7.00 (SD=1.30) prior to the vigilance task and a mean score 
of 6.90 (SD=1.55) after the task. The results of a mixed 2 (group: dysphoric, non-dysphoric) 
x 2 (time: before and after the vigilance task) ANOVA showed the self-assessed mood scores 
of the dysphoric group to be reliably lower, as reflected in a strong main effect of group, F(1, 
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38) = 12.41, p=.001, ηp2=.23. Neither the time of assessment nor the interaction between 
group and time showed a significant effect (both F<1).  
2.3 Materials 
2.3.1 Mood Questionnaire  
The Beck Depression Inventory is a reliable 21-item questionnaire, designed to give a 
standard measure of behaviours indicative of depression (Beck et al., 1961). Each item 
consists of 4 to 6 statements that vary in severity. Participants were asked to choose which 
statement best represented how they had been feeling over the previous week. A 
corresponding score (from 0 to 3) was tallied for each item to determine a participants’ 
overall BDI score. Individual scores in the present study ranged from 0 to 32 (see Table 1) 
but the highest possible score is 63. Higher scores indicate more severe depressive symptoms.  
2.3.2 Vigilance Task 
 During the laboratory session participants completed a modified version of the 
computer-based vigilance task, originally developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008). 
The task consisted of a 600-slide presentation, displayed on a laptop using SuperLab 
software. Most of the slides depicted arrangements of black, horizontal lines (non-target 
stimuli), but participants were asked to press the computer spacebar when arrangements of 
black, vertical lines (target stimuli) appeared.  These target stimuli appeared 11 times 
throughout the 600 slide presentation, with a minimum of 40 and a maximum of 60 slides 
between each target. The slides were 21.5 x 12.5 cm in size and featured centrally oriented 
cue words or phrases in 18-point Arial font.  All cue words had been previously rated by 8 
independent coders as negative, positive or neutral, and all received at least 75% agreement 
(Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). Equal numbers of positive (n=200), negative (n= 200) 
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and neutral (n=200), cues were distributed throughout the presentation. Of the 11 target 
slides, 4 featured positive cues, 4 featured negative cues, and 3 featured natural cues. Slides 
were presented in a fixed random order, each appearing for 1500 milliseconds. At 11 fixed 
points during the presentation, the sequence of slides stopped and the message “Please stop 
and record your concentration and thoughts now” appeared on the screen. There were a 
minimum of 35 and a maximum of 70 slides between each stop trial.  
2.3.3 Thought Questionnaire 
Participants recorded their thoughts during the vigilance task with a pre-structured, 
two-page questionnaire based on a format used by Kvavilashvili and Schlagman (2011). At 
the top of the first page, participants were asked to give a brief description of their thoughts at 
the moment they were stopped, and indicate if the thought occurred spontaneously (i.e., 
simply popped into their mind) or whether they deliberately decided to think about it. If 
spontaneous, they were asked to indicate whether the thought had been triggered by the 
environment, by their own thoughts, or if there was no trigger. A blank space was provided to 
describe the trigger if identifiable. In the final two questions on the first page, participants 
were asked to indicate how much they were concentrating on the task when stopped (1=Not 
at all, 5=Fully concentrating), as well as the vividness of their thought on a 7-point scale 
(1=Very vague, almost no image at all, 7=Very vivid, almost like normal vision).  
On the second page, which was completed after finishing the vigilance task, 
participants categorised their thoughts as a past memory, future event or current situation. If 
they chose a memory or future thought, they also estimated how far in the past it had 
occurred, or how far in the future they were projecting. Participants indicated on a 5-point 
scale how often they had experienced the thought prior to participation in the laboratory 
session (1=Never, 2=Once or twice, 3=A few times, 4=Several times, 5=Many times), and 
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rated the thought for pleasantness on a 5-point scale (1=Very unpleasant, 3=Neutral, 5=Very 
pleasant). The final question asked participants to indicate the specificity of their thought by 
ticking the box corresponding to one of three responses: One-off event; General thought 
about a repetitive event; General thought about an extended event.  
2.4 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet location. When first welcomed into the 
laboratory, participants were reminded of the focus of the project (the effect of mood on 
concentration).  The experimenter verbally confirmed the instructions in the information 
sheet: participants had to ignore slides depicting horizontal lines, but press the spacebar when 
they detected a slide with vertical lines. They were also told to ignore the words or phrases 
that appeared in the centre of the slides. Participants were set a practice trial which lasted one 
minute, and consisted of 37 non-target and 3 target stimuli, with no stop trials.  
 Once the practice trial was complete, participants were given the following verbal 
instructions to briefly illustrate the kinds of off-task thinking they might experience:  
As you can see this experiment is about people’s attention and their concentration during 
fairly lengthy monotonous tasks. You might be familiar with the situation in which your 
thoughts wander off during an easy monotonous task (for example, driving). However, at 
critical points, such as when approaching roundabouts, you will need to pay attention to what 
you are doing again. Our study is interested in these fluctuations in concentration and 
thought during such monotonous tasks. In addition, we are also interested in the effects of 
verbal and non-verbal information on your concentration levels throughout the task. Hence, 
some participants will be detecting lines on the screen and other participants need to detect 
certain words. You have been allocated to the group that detects lines. Therefore, just ignore 
the words and concentrate on the lines.  
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The main vigilance task is similar to the practice one but longer. In addition, the presentation 
will occasionally stop, and you will be prompted to record your concentration level and 
thoughts at the moment you were stopped.  
As you can see, although this task is quite simple, it can be difficult to maintain 
concentration. As with the driving example, your thoughts may drift to matters unrelated to 
the task. These thoughts can be about anything: the past, present or the future. They may be 
thoughts that pop into your mind spontaneously, or they may be something you have 
deliberately chosen to think about. It doesn’t matter if your concentration and thoughts 
fluctuate in this way throughout the presentation, but please ensure that you write down the 
content of your thoughts at the exact moment you are stopped. Each time you are stopped by 
the presentation, you will be provided with a questionnaire to record your thoughts and 
assess your level of concentration.  
Written consent was obtained, and participants were also asked to rate their current 
mood on a 9-point scale (1=extremely negative, 5=neutral, 9=extremely positive). Once this 
was complete, they were told that they could commence the presentation whenever they liked 
by pressing any computer key. When the first stop trial appeared, the experimenter 
immediately gave the participant a copy of the questionnaire to record a description of their 
thought. The experimenter explained each subsequent item on the first page of the 
questionnaire before the participant gave their response. Participants were asked to return the 
questionnaire to the experimenter once the first page had been completed, and told that they 
could begin the presentation again by left-clicking the laptop mouse.   
At each subsequent stop trial, participants were given a new, blank questionnaire, 
which they returned to the experimenter upon completion of the first page. Once the vigilance 
task was finished, participants were asked to complete the second page of each questionnaire. 
The experimenter indicated that participants should review their responses on first side before 
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proceeding to the second side. As with the first side of the questionnaire, the researcher took 
time to explain each item before giving the participant an opportunity to respond. 
Questionnaires were given to the participant one by one, and returned to the researcher upon 
completion. Once both sides of all questionnaires were complete, participants were asked to 
rate their mood again on the 9-point scale, and complete the mood questionnaire (BDI).  
3. Results 
3.1. Data Coding and Analysis 
Coding and analysis depended on the type of data used.  For the items measured on a 
scale (e.g., concentration, vividness, rehearsal and pleasantness) the mean values were 
calculated for each type of thought reported by a participant (across the 11 stop trials), before 
being entered into the ANOVA. Dichotomous items or those with discrete categories (e.g., 
deliberate/spontaneous, trigger, specificity of the thought) were calculated as proportions. 
This is in line with previous research in this area (e.g., Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Kvavilashvili 
& Schlagman, 2011; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). The alpha level adopted for 
determining significance of the results was set at 0.05.   
3.2. Performance on Vigilance Task 
All 40 participants successfully completed the vigilance task by detecting the majority 
of targets out of 11 presented (see Table 2). There were no group differences in the number of 
detected targets or reported concentration levels (p =.46 and p =.55. respectively), but 
dysphoric participants were marginally slower at responding to targets than non-dysphoric 
participants (p =.08).  
3.3. Frequency and Type of Recorded Thoughts 
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 Given that each participant was stopped 11 times during the vigilance task, the total 
number of thought probes was 40 x 11 = 440. However, due to a computer error, 6 probes 
were not recorded, resulting in 434 thoughts. In addition, on 17 occasions (11 of which were 
reported in the dysphoric group), participants indicated that their mind was blank at the time 
of being stopped reducing the number of valid thought probes to 417.  
Before conducting the data analyses, all thoughts recorded by participants were 
independently coded by the first and second authors as either task-related or task-unrelated 
following the criteria used in mind-wandering research (e.g., Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe & 
Obonsawin, 2003; Smallwood, Obonsawin & Reid, 2003). The majority of task related 
thoughts (86%) referred to so called task-related interference (TRI) rather than thoughts about 
detecting vertical lines. These consisted of any references to aspects of the vigilance task 
(e.g., was wondering how many different patterns of lines are being used in this experiment; 
remember to press the space bar, but there are not many vertical lines), any mention of the 
phrases on the screen (e.g., air-loom was spelt wrong; just reading the words, trying to see if 
I can remember them), or any reference to a state/emotion that arose in response to the 
vigilance task (e.g., I’m feeling quite anxious about the words; the words go so quick, the sad 
ones stay with me, like oppressive regime).3 In contrast, task-unrelated thoughts were those 
which did not contain any explicit reference to the vigilance task and referred to either past 
(e.g., childhood memory of going on holiday with my parents to a village in the Lake District; 
blue coat my wife tried on in the shop last week), present (e.g., thinking about my insecurities 
and weaknesses; thinking about my fiancée being abroad at the moment) or future (e.g., need 
to start my diet after the revision period; job interview I have next week). Inter-rater 
reliability between the coders was very good (Kappa=.90, SE=.03).4  Out of 417 valid 
thought probes, 91 (22%) that were classed as task-related thoughts were removed, leaving 
325 task-unrelated thoughts. 
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In addition, during each thought probe, participants indicated whether their thought 
had arisen spontaneously or deliberately.  Spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts (87%) far 
outnumbered deliberate thoughts (13%) (see Table 3), with no differences between the 
groups, χ2(2, N=342)=2.99, p=0.22).  As spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts were the 
primary focus of the present study, instances of deliberate thoughts were removed from 
further analysis, leaving a total of 283 thought probes.  
Finally, of the 40 participants, four outliers (two in each group) were excluded from 
analyses because of the very low frequency with which they reported spontaneous, task-
unrelated thoughts. One participant had not recorded any spontaneous thoughts (either task-
related or task-unrelated) and the three others had only reported one spontaneous, task-
unrelated thought, out of 11 thought probes collected. Between them, they accounted for 31 
of 42 deliberate, task-unrelated thoughts reported in Table 3, which is 74% of all deliberate, 
task-unrelated thoughts recorded. With these participants removed, the final data set 
consisted of 280 spontaneous, task-unrelated thoughts in 36 participants (17 dysphoric, 19 
non-dysphoric). All analyses reported below are based on these 280 thought probes.  
3.4 Content of Recorded Thought Probes 
3.4.1 Temporal Location of Thoughts 
At the end of the vigilance task participants coded each of their recorded thoughts as 
past memories, future thoughts or thoughts about a current situation. In the dysphoric group, 
out of 130 task unrelated thoughts, 60 were classed as past memories (46%), 33 as thoughts 
about the future (25%) and 37 as current thoughts (29%). Out of 150 valid thought probes in 
the non-dysphoric group, 62 were memories (41%), 42 were future thoughts (28%) and 46 – 
current thoughts (31%). The mean frequency with which dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
participants reported each temporality of thought is presented in Table 4. The mean number 
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of each type of thought were entered into a 2 (group: dysphoric, non-dysphoric) x 3 (thought 
type: current, past memory, future) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. 
The results revealed a significant main effect of thought type, F(2, 68)=4.24, p=0.02 
ηp2=0.11.  Pairwise comparisons indicated that the frequency of past memories was 
significantly greater than future thoughts (p=0.01) and current thoughts (p=0.03), but future 
and current thoughts did not differ from each other (p=0.65). Neither the main effect of 
group, nor the group by thought interaction, were significant (both Fs<1).  
3.4.2 Content of Future Thoughts 
A thematic content analysis (Smith, 2000) was conducted on thoughts categorised by 
participants as ‘future thoughts’ by two independent coders (the first and the second author) 
in two stages. Initially, both coders read the descriptions to derive super-ordinate themes or 
categories which, in their opinion, could encompass most of the recorded cases. This was 
followed by a discussion of these themes which resulted in three distinct categories referred 
to as ‘future planning’, ‘thinking about an upcoming event’ and ‘thinking about a 
hypothetical event’ (hereafter referred to simply as ‘planning,’ ‘upcoming event’ and 
‘hypothetical event’). The ‘planning’ label referred to any thought that was goal oriented, and 
reflected an intention to complete a particular activity (e.g., must get a new duvet cover set). 
‘Upcoming events’ included all thoughts about scheduled future events that had not yet 
occurred, but around which no particular intention was expressed (e.g., family dinner this 
weekend; how long until Christmas? Quite soon). Finally, the third category included all 
thoughts that were hypothetical or speculative in nature (e.g., would love to feel more settled 
financially, wishing for no money worries; feeling very scared if something happens to my 
sons; I wonder how would it look if you put red lipstick on a goldfish). In the second stage, all 
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future thoughts were independently coded by the coders into these three different categories: 
Inter-rater reliability between the coders was good (Kappa=.69, SE=.06). 
 The mean frequency with which dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants 
experienced each type of future thought is presented in Figure 1. These were entered into a 2 
(group: dysphoric, non-dysphoric) x 3 (future thought type: planning, upcoming event, 
hypothetical event) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. Results 
revealed a significant group by thought type interaction F(2,68)=7.75, p=.001, ηp2=.186. 
Pairwise comparisons indicated that the non-dysphoric group experienced more planning 
thoughts than the dysphoric group (p=.045), whilst the dysphoric group experienced more 
abstract hypothetical thoughts (p=.003). There was no group difference in the number of 
upcoming events recorded (p=.24). Neither group nor type of future thought alone produced a 
significant effect (both Fs<1). 
3.5 Frequency of reported triggers  
The majority of reported thoughts in both dysphoric (83%) and non-dysphoric (86%) 
groups had an identifiable external trigger. Of these, the majority of triggers were words 
appearing on the screen, as was the case with 89% of thoughts reported by dysphoric 
participants, and 85% of thoughts reported by non-dysphoric participants. Words on the 
screen were more likely to elicit thoughts about the past and the future than the current 
situation, in both dysphoric χ2(4, N=108)=20.20, p=.001 and non-dysphoric χ2(4, 
N=129)=13.58, p=.009 groups (see Table 5).   
3.6 Mood Congruency Effects   
3.6.1 Emotional Valence of Reported Cues 
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Because participants reported the cue word appearing on the screen that triggered 
their thought, this enabled examination of cue valence as a function of thought temporality 
and dysphoria. Initially, all the analyses reported in this section included group (dysphoric 
and non-dysphoric) as a between subjects variable. Because none of these analyses resulted in 
the main effects of group (all Fs<1.6), and the group factor did not interact with cue valence 
(all Fs<1), the results reported below are based on one-way ANOVAs with cue valence 
(negative, positive and neutral) as a within subjects factor. In the initial analysis, the 
dependent variable was the number of negative, neutral and positive cue words that 
participants reported as triggers for their thoughts, regardless of their temporality. This 
resulted in a main effect of cue valence F(2,68)=13.71, p=.001 ηp2=0.29. Post hoc 
comparisons revealed that the mean number of positive (M=2.34, SD=1.33) and negative 
(M=1.97, SD=1.42) cues was significantly higher than the mean number of neutral cues 
(M=1.06, SD=1.16), (both p=.001), but there was no difference in the frequency of negative 
and positive cues (p=0.19), indicating that generally both positive and negative cues were 
more effective in eliciting task unrelated thoughts than neutral cues.  
This initial analysis was followed up by three, one-way ANOVAs with cue valence as 
a within subjects factor, conducted separately for memories, current thoughts, and future 
thoughts. Means are presented in Table 6.  As this table shows, the main effect of cue valence 
emerged for each thought category, however, post hoc comparisons revealed somewhat 
different patterns. In the case of memories, pairwise comparisons revealed that the mean 
number of memories reported in response to negative cues was significantly higher than 
memories reported in response to neutral cues (p=0.001) but not positive cues (p=0.24). 
Reported memories with positive cues did not differ from memories with neutral cues 
(p=0.11). In contrast, post hoc comparisons for future thoughts indicate that the mean number 
of positive cues was significantly higher than both neutral and negative cues (both p=0.001), 
                                            Role of triggers and dysphoria in mind-wandering  
	   	   	   	  
	  
25	  
which did not differ from each other (p=1.0). Finally, comparisons for current thoughts 
revealed both negative (p=0.03) and positive (p=0.008) cues were reported significantly more 
often than neutral cues, but there was no difference between them (p=0.85). These results 
seem to suggest that in both groups of participants, negative cues were more likely to produce 
past memories and positive cues were more likely to produce future thoughts.  
3.6.2 Pleasantness of reported thoughts  
 To evaluate the hypothesis that dysphoric participants would rate their thoughts more 
negatively, we conducted three separate t-tests on participants’ pleasantness ratings for 
current thoughts, past memories and future thoughts (see Table 7). Results indicated that 
dysphoric participants rated their past memories as significantly less pleasant than non-
dysphoric participants, which replicates earlier findings of Kvavilashvili and Schlagman 
(2011). While the difference for future thoughts was in the same direction, it did not reach 
statistically accepted level of significance (p=.14). The difference between the groups for 
current thoughts was not significant.5  
3.7 Additional Findings 
Table 7 shows the results of t-tests comparing dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants on 
several other dependent variables separately for types of thought (memories, current and 
future thoughts). No statistically significant group differences were obtained for ratings of 
vividness, rehearsal, or the proportion of specific thoughts reported.  
3.7.1 Timeframe 
The majority of future thoughts were projections into the immediate future (less than 
one month), and very few future thoughts were about possible events in the distant future (more 
than one year). With regard to memories, the pattern was almost inverted. The majority of 
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memories were based on events occurring more than one year in the past, and fewer were based 
on events occurring within the previous month.  This was the case in both dysphoric χ2(2, 
N=90)=14.17, p=0.001 and non-dysphoric  χ2(2, N=105)=20.02, p=0.001 groups (Table 8).  
4. Discussion 
Although instances of IAMs can be considered a manifestation of mind-wandering 
(Johannessen & Berntsen, 2010), research in these two areas has proceeded largely 
independently from each other. In addition, discrepant findings have started to emerge 
concerning several important variables. The aim of the present paper was to shed some light 
on potential causes for discrepant findings by investigating mind-wandering with a modified 
version of a laboratory method for studying IAMs (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).  
Using this method to study mind-wandering, the following questions were addressed: What is 
the role of environmental cues in triggering off-task thought? What is the relationship of 
thought content and temporal focus to the cues presented, and how is that relationship 
affected by dysphoria? 
Several important findings emerged from the study. First, the present task elicited a 
high rate of mind-wandering, with 78% of all thought probes being task-unrelated and 68% 
being task unrelated and spontaneous. In addition, there was a predominance of past thoughts 
in that participants classed their reported thoughts significantly more often as thoughts about 
the past (i.e., as memories) than thoughts about present or future, which did not differ from 
each other. Second, the vast majority of task unrelated thoughts were reported to have been 
triggered by irrelevant cue words on the screen and cue valence interacted with the 
temporality of reported thoughts: negative cues were more likely to elicit past memories 
while positive cues were more likely to elicit thoughts about the future. The third set of 
findings concerns the effects of dysphoria on mind-wandering. Thus, dysphoric and non-
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dysphoric participants did not differ from each other in the frequency of reported thoughts 
about the past, present or future. However, significant differences emerged in terms of the 
type of recorded future thought whereby dysphoric participants recorded more abstract 
hypothetical thoughts in comparison to non-dysphoric participants, and the latter reported 
more goal-directed planning thoughts. In addition, dysphoric participants rated their past 
memories as more negative than non-dysphoric participants, while the difference for thoughts 
about the future was in the same direction but did not reach acceptable levels of significance. 
Finally, no statistically significant group differences emerged for ratings of vividness and 
prior rehearsal or the specificity of reported thoughts. Below, we will discuss these findings 
as well as their implications for research on mind-wandering and IAMs. 
4.1. Role of cues in triggering mind-wandering 
One of the most important findings of the present study concerns the role of cues in 
eliciting mind-wandering episodes irrespective of their temporal focus. Thus, the 
incorporation of verbal cues into a monotonous vigilance task, combined with the removal of 
all demand characteristics (i.e., not indicating to participants that researchers were interested 
in a particular type of thought) reliably triggered thoughts about a personal past, imagined 
future or current situation. Moreover, our results showed, for the first time, that positive cues 
were more likely to trigger spontaneous thoughts about the future than thoughts about the 
past or present. In contrast, the finding that negative cues were more likely to trigger past 
memories (see also Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008) has 
clear evolutionary advantages as they may act as powerful reminders of negative events and, 
by doing so, help the individual to avoid potentially dangerous situations (cf. Schank, 1999).   
These results replicate and significantly extend the earlier findings by Song and Wang 
(2012) and McVay and Kane (2013) on the role of cues in eliciting mind-wandering episodes. 
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They are also in line with the results of Berntsen and Jacobsen’s (2008) diary study, which 
showed that 84% and 76% of recorded IAMs and spontaneous future thoughts were reported 
as being triggered by cues (with 52% and 34% of reported cues being external, respectively). 
Taken together, the results provide strong initial support for the “intriguing possibility that 
autobiographical associations with the current task environment have a potential to cue the 
disinterested mind” (p. 118, Smallwood, Nind et al., 2009), and open up interesting avenues 
for future research. For example, the findings concerning the cue valence need to be 
replicated and extended by examining other characteristics of cues (their frequency, modality, 
verbal vs. non-verbal, distinctiveness, etc.). More systematic research is also needed to study 
the relationship between cues and current concerns stipulated by Klinger’s (1999; 2013) 
current concerns theory. Although McVay and Kane (2013) provided initial support for this 
relationship by showing 3-4% increase in task unrelated thoughts on probes preceded by 
current concern related words in comparison to neutral words, it is possible that some cues 
that are not directly linked to one’s current concerns and goals can still elicit thoughts about 
the past and future. Indeed, in a study by Johannesen and Berntsen (2010), only 51% of 
recorded IAMs were related to participants’ current concerns. In addition, external cues were 
reported more often for non-concern related IAMs than IAMs related to current concern, 
while internal cues were more often reported for the concern-related IAMs. This interesting 
pattern clearly needs further investigation.   
4.2. Temporal focus of task unrelated thoughts 
 Another novel finding concerns the temporality of recorded thought probes. While the 
majority of studies on mind-wandering report that participants are more likely to prospect 
than retrospect during vigilance tasks, results of the present study showed that participants, 
irrespective of their mood, were more likely to think about the past than future. One possible 
reason for discrepant findings is the differences in the methods used. Although most studies 
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on temporal focus of mind-wandering have used ongoing tasks that were comparable to the 
low attentional demands of the vigilance task in the present study (e.g., simple choice 
reaction tasks or passive observation of stimuli, see Baird et al., 2011; Smallwood, Nind et 
al., 2009, Experiment 1), they all used meaningless stimuli (i.e., single digits) which could 
not have acted as triggers for task unrelated thoughts. 
This important difference between the methods used raises an interesting hypothesis 
that when people are in an environment that is devoid of meaningful cues they are more 
likely to think about the future but when they are in stimulus rich environment (like in the 
present study) they are more likely to think about their past than future. One way to test this 
hypothesis is to compare the temporal focus of thought probes in a vigilance task with verbal 
cues presented on each slide (as in the present study) to an identical vigilance task with no 
verbal cues presented on the slides. 
Another important variable to consider in conjunction with presence/absence of cues 
concerns the amount of attentional resources needed for the ongoing task. Research has 
shown that the frequency of future thoughts is diminished during an ongoing working 
memory task when compared to less demanding choice reaction time tasks (Smallwood et al., 
2011; Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009). Similarly, some fMRI studies of mind-wandering have 
also failed to demonstrate the significant prospective bias in thought probes, presumably 
because the scanner noise is making the ongoing vigilance more demanding than those used 
in standard mind-wandering experiments (e.g., Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, & Buckner, 
2010; Mason et al, 2007). Therefore, future research needs to investigate more systematically 
the role of cues and task demands in eliciting prospective bias in task unrelated thoughts.  
4.3. Dysphoria and mind-wandering 
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Previous research on mind-wandering has resulted in findings which show a positive 
relationship between participants’ depression scores and their tendency to mind-wander (e.g., 
Murphy et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2005, 2007; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Van der Linden, & 
D’Argembeau, 2012). In addition, some studies have also shown that the induction of 
negative mood increases one’s tendency to think about the past than future (Smallwood, 
Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). These findings have 
been explained by the greater ease with which dysphoric participants ‘decouple’ from the 
immediate environment, to focus on internal thoughts and feelings (Smallwood et al., 2007). 
However, in the present study, no statistically reliable group differences were found in either 
objective or subjective measures of decoupling. Dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants 
reported similar levels of concentration on the task, and showed similar performance in terms 
of target detection and response time. Most important, they did not differ from non-dysphoric 
participants in the number of spontaneous task unrelated thoughts, and the predominance of 
thoughts about the past was present in both groups of participants. 
How could one explain these discrepant findings? First, it should be pointed out that 
the relationship between levels of dysphoria and mind-wandering have not been reported in 
all mind-wandering studies (e.g., Marchetti, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012; Smallwood, Davies, 
et al., 2004, Studies 1 and 2). Second, the different findings are probably due to the divergent 
methods used. As pointed out earlier, several mind-wandering studies have used the SART or 
simple choice reaction time task, which do not contain any verbal material. This raises the 
possibility that dysphoric participants are more likely to experience task unrelated thoughts 
than non-dysphoric participants when the environment is devoid of meaningful stimuli. When 
such stimuli are present, however, they are not different from non-dysphoric participants, as 
shown by the results of our study on task unrelated thoughts and the study by Kvavilashvili 
and Schlagman (2011) on IAMs (see also Watson et al., 2013). 
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However, some mind-wandering studies have used tasks with meaningful stimuli 
(e.g., encoding words or completing word fragments) instead of vigilance tasks and have also 
shown positive relationship between levels of dysphoria and tendency to mind-wander (e.g., 
Smallwood, Obonsawin, Baracaia, Reid, O'Connor, & Heim, 2003; Smallwood et al., 2005). 
However, encoding words for subsequent retrieval is attentionally much more demanding 
task than the simple vigilance task used in the present study. It is therefore possible that 
dysphoric people, due to their reduced working memory capacity (see Christopher & 
MacDonald, 2005; Owens, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012), have difficulties maintaining task 
focus when they are engaged in attentionally demanding tasks but not when they are engaged 
in non-demanding tasks. For example, McVay and Kane (2009) found that people with low 
working memory capacity reported higher levels of mind-wandering during the attentionally 
demanding SART with verbal stimuli (see also Kane et. al., 2007). Further support for this 
contention comes from a study by Smallwood et al. (2007) who showed that dysphoric 
participants had higher levels of task unrelated thoughts during the word encoding task but 
not during the less demanding word shadowing tasks. Therefore, future research should 
orthogonally manipulate these variables (i.e., presence/absence of meaningful cues and task 
difficulty) when studying mind-wandering and its temporal focus in people with dysphoria 
and clinical depression. 
Another novel finding that emerged from the present study in relation to dysphoria 
concerns group differences in the nature of thoughts about future. The fact that dysphoric 
participants reported more fanciful, hypothetical thoughts than non-dysphoric participants, 
and fewer goal directed planning thoughts suggests that the adaptive function of future 
oriented thought (D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Szpunar, 2010) is significantly compromised in 
dysphoria. This finding has interesting clinical implications, offering reasons for the success 
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of certain methods such as cognitive behavioural therapy in treating depression and dysphoria 
and suggesting a basis upon which such interventions might be reviewed and modified. 
4.4. Implications of findings for research on mind-wandering 
Findings of the present study have important implications for research on mind-
wandering. In terms of theory, the results show that it may be necessary to reconceptualise 
our understanding of mind-wandering as stimulus independent. Although Klinger (2013) has 
consistently emphasised the role of triggers in eliciting mind-wandering episodes, this 
position has not been universally accepted in mind-wandering literature. The dominant view 
appears to be the one that considers mind-wandering as internally rather than externally 
generated. To emphasise this aspect of mind-wandering, Stawarczyk et al. (2011) proposed a 
framework that distinguishes the task unrelated thoughts that are stimulus independent (i.e., 
internally generated), so called SITUTs, from task unrelated thoughts that arise from 
environmental distracters or EDs (e.g., noise in the street). According to their framework, 
only the former are true instances of mind-wandering whereas the latter are not. If one adopts 
this position, then none of the task unrelated thoughts that were triggered by irrelevant cue 
words (i.e., distracters) in the present study would qualify as task unrelated thoughts. It is also 
interesting that Stawarczyk et al. (2011) reported similar patterns of results for SITUTs and 
EDs indicating that task unrelated thoughts instigated by environmental stimuli may be 
functionally equivalent to task unrelated thoughts that are internally generated.  
Our results seem to indicate that mind-wandering is stimulus independent only once 
the task unrelated thoughts are set in motion, but that it is stimulus dependent in terms of 
identifiable cues that trigger these thoughts in the first place. This is in line with Klinger’s 
(2013) theory and a process-occurrence framework recently proposed by Smallwood (2013) 
which makes an important distinction between the initial occurrence of task unrelated trains 
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of thoughts and the maintenance of such thought over time. According to Smallwood (2013), 
while our understanding of processes that maintain the internal train of thought has increased 
over the past years, “identifying the onset of self-generated mental activity must be a primary 
focus for future research into mind-wandering state” (p. 532) (see also McVay & Kane, 
2013). More in depth investigation of various characteristics of external cues that may trigger 
mind-wandering episodes may be a particularly useful avenue in that direction.   
In terms of methodology, the results of the present study show that participants 
reported being engaged in spontaneous task-unrelated thoughts in 68% of valid thought 
probes (in 283 probes out of 417), which is considerably higher than rates reported in other 
mind-wandering studies. In these studies, proportions of task unrelated thought probes 
typically vary between .14 to .29 in the non-verbal SART or fairly demanding word encoding 
tasks, and between .32 and .35 in less demanding (but non-verbal) choice reaction tasks or 
passive observing (Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Smallwood, O’Connor, et al., 2004; 
Smallwood et al., 2011; 2007). Even when incorporating verbal stimuli in the standard 
SART, McVay and Kane (2013) still obtained lower rates of mind-wandering (.43 to .46 
across 4 Experiments) than in the present study. It appears that it is a combination of rich 
stimulus environment together with a very undemanding ongoing task that produced high 
levels of mind-wandering in the present study. This means that the frequency of mind-
wandering is somewhat underestimated by current laboratory research on mind-wandering 
that uses predominantly non-verbal stimuli and/or fairly demanding ongoing tasks. 
4.5. Implications for research on involuntary autobiographical memories 
 Findings are also important for research on IAMs. They clearly show that the 
Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) method with a simple vigilance task and constant stream 
of irrelevant verbal stimuli does reliably elicit IAMs in the absence of demand characteristics 
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(i.e., explicit instructions to record IAMs) and that under these conditions participants are 
more likely to experience past memories than thoughts about present or future. 
However, one of the important differences between research on IAMs and mind-
wandering is that in the latter, whether using laboratory vigilance tasks or a naturalistic 
experience sampling method, task-unrelated thoughts are often assessed by unpredictable 
thought probes which reduce the possibility of any bias and demand characteristics. By 
contrast, in diary studies of IAMs and in the laboratory method of Schlagman and 
Kvavilashvili (2008), participants are introduced to the concept of IAMs and are asked to 
record IAMs themselves whenever they realise they are having them (self-caught probe 
method). This arrangement may ‘prime’ participants to have more memories than usual and 
/or create a situation where only the most distinctive IAMs get noticed and recorded. To 
examine these issues Vannucci et al. (2014) manipulated instructions by asking participants 
to either report IAMs or any task unrelated thoughts during the vigilance task and the type of 
probes used (self-caught vs. experimenter-caught). Their results showed that more IAMs 
were recorded when participants were asked to report IAMs than any task unrelated thoughts. 
In addition, the number of IAMs was higher when the experimenter stopped the participants 
than when participants reported thoughts themselves. The latter finding indicates that 
participants probably had more IAMs than they were able to notice and that being stopped by 
the experimenter helped them realise at the time that the contents of their thoughts were 
memories of past events. 
Similar findings have started to emerge from dairy studies of IAMs by showing that 
when participants are asked to record IAMs for shorter periods of time (e.g., just one day) 
they record about the same number of memories (see Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen, 2013; 
Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2011) than when they are asked to record memories for one week 
(e.g., see Schlagman, Kliegel, Schulz, & Kvavilashvili, 2009). This suggests that with shorter 
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periods of recording people become more attentive to the contents of their mind than when 
they are given longer periods of time for recording (see also Kamiya, 2014). 
Finally, results of Vannucci et al. (2014) suggest that when the self-caught probe 
method is used, participants may be recording only a sub-class of memories which are 
phenomenologically different from other IAMs. Specifically, they showed that when 
participants knew in advance they had to report IAMs, the percentage of specific IAMs 
(memories of one off events not lasting longer than a day) was high (74.5%) and comparable 
to proportions reported by Kvavilashvili and Schlagman (2008) and in previous diary studies 
of IAMs (e.g., Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Berntsen, 1998; Schlagman et al., 2009). Surprisingly, 
the percentage of specific memories was much lower (59.5%) when participants did not know 
that IAMs were studied, i.e., when they had to report any task unrelated thoughts (some of 
which were later coded as memories). In the present study, which also used experimenter 
imposed rather than self-caught probes, we replicated this initial finding by showing that the 
percentages of specific IAMs in dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants were similarly low 
at 46% and 57.7%, respectively. Taken together, results of Vannucci et al. (2014) and the 
present study suggest that research on IAMs may have been studying only a sub-sample of all 
available involuntary memories. In order to address this issue it may be necessary for 
researchers of IAMs to adopt the experimenter-caught probing procedure when using both 
laboratory and diary methods of investigation (e.g., see Mazzoni et. al., 2014). 
4.6. Conclusions 
  The present study employed a laboratory method from IAM research to study task 
unrelated thoughts about past, present and future, in an effort to integrate these related but 
separate areas of research. Several important findings were obtained that have implications 
for research on both mind-wandering an IAMs and open up interesting avenues for future 
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research. Most important, the findings indicate that mind-wandering research would benefit 
from using less demanding tasks which incorporate meaningful stimuli to be able to establish 
the onset of task-unrelated train of thoughts, while research on IAMs should adopt the 
probing techniques used in mind-wandering research to avoid demand characteristics and 
sample a wider pool of available memories.  
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Footnotes 
 
1 However, being cue-dependent does not mean that IAMs are not task unrelated or 
spontaneous (cf. Berntsen, 1996). Indeed, remembering the birthday party may be completely 
unrelated to a task at hand (driving to supermarket) and is involuntary as long as there was no 
intention to remember anything at the time. 
2   Although it is customary to use a cut-off point of 9 and above on BDI to class participants 
as dysphoric or depressed (see Cox, Enns, Borger, & Parker, 1999), we followed the 
recommendation of Vredenburg, Flett, and Krames (1993) and used a cut-off point of 16 and 
above, which corresponds to moderate depression (Beck, 1967) and reduces the chances of 
participants being classed as non-depressed when tested a second time (see Zimmerman, 
1986). 
3 The large number of TRIs was probably due to the undemanding nature of the vigilance 
task, which enabled almost perfect target detection without the necessity to engage in 
excessive monitoring. There were no reliable differences between the dysphoric and non-
dysphoric groups in the frequency of reported TRIs, t(38)=0.4, p=0.69.   
4 There is considerable variability among researchers regarding what is considered good inter-
rater reliability as measured by Cohen’s Kappa. Landis and Koch (1977) considered a 
Cohen’s Kappa of 0.60 and 0.80 to be substantial agreement and between 0.81 and 1.0 as 
perfect.  For purposes of the present study, a Cohen’s Kappa between 0.60 and 0.80 will be 
considered good, and above 0.81 will be considered very good.  
5 A content analysis was conducted to examine whether dysphoric participants recorded more 
past memories and future thoughts with objectively negative content (see Schlagman, Schulz, 
& Kvavilashvili, 2006). Similar to previous findings (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011), no 
group differences emerged. 
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Table 1 
Mean BDI scores (Standard Deviation, Range) Before and After the Laboratory Session. 
  Before Lab After Lab 
 BDI SD Range   BDI SD Range 
Dysphoric 22.16 6.03 16-32   20.47 4.12 16-30 
Non-dysphoric 3.05 2.66 0-9   2.48 1.97 0-7 
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Table 2 
Mean (Standard Deviation) Target Detection, Response Time and Concentration Rating in  
Dysphoric and Non-Dysphoric Groups, and Results of Independent Samples T-test. 
 Dysphoric  Non-
Dysphoric 
t df p 
Target Detection 10.65 (1.06) 10.84 (0.37) -0.75 34 0.46 
Response Time (ms) 790.62 (210.97) 687.53 (92.02) 1.86 21.36 0.08 
Concentration Rating 3.48 (0.64) 3.64 (0.93) -0.61 34 0.55 
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Table 3 
Frequency (Percentage) of Spontaneous and Deliberate Task-Unrelated Thoughts as a  
Function of Group (Dysphoric vs. Non-Dysphoric). 
Group  Spontaneous Deliberate Total 
Dysphoric 131 (85%) 23 (15%) 154 (100%) 
Non-dysphoric 152 (89%) 19 (11%) 171 (100%) 
Total 283 (87%) 42 (13%) 325 (100%) 
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Table 4 
Mean Number (Standard Deviation) of Thoughts Reported as a Function of Type of Thought  
(Past vs. Current vs. Future) and Group (Dysphoric vs. Non-Dysphoric). 
Group  Past Memory Current  Future Thought 
Dysphoric  3.47 (1.84) 2.24 (1.48) 1.94 (1.48) 
Non-dysphoric  3.32 (2.06) 2.37 (1.71) 2.21 (1.93) 
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Table 5 
Frequency (Percentage) of Reported Triggers as a Function of Type of Thought (Past vs.  
Current vs. Future) and Group (Dysphoric vs. Non-Dysphoric).  
  Type of Environmental Trigger 
 Type of Thought   Words on screen Other Total 
Dysphoric Past Memory 51 (98%) 1 (2%) 52 (100%) 
 Current 22 (71%) 9  (29%) 31 (100%) 
 Future Thought 23 (92%) 2 (8%) 25 (100%) 
 Total 96 (89%) 12 (11%) 108 (100%) 
Non-Dysphoric Past Memory 55 (93%) 4 (7%) 58 (100%) 
 Current 26 (68%) 12 (32%) 38 (100%) 
 Future Thought 30 (91%) 3 (9%) 33 (100%) 
 Total 110 (85%) 17 (15%) 129 (100%) 
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Table 6  
Mean Frequency (Standard Deviation) of Reported Cues as a Function of Cue Valence  
(Negative, Positive, Neutral) and Temporal Focus of Reported Thought (Past Memory,  
Current Thought, Future Thought).   
                                  Cue Valence ANOVA Results 
Type of Thought Negative Positive Neutral F df p ηp2 
Past Memory 1.42 (1.12) 1.10 (0.94) 0.71 (0.86) 4.74 2, 60 0.01 0.14 
Current  0.71 (0.75) 0.75 (0.74) 0.29 (0.46) 3.75 2, 46 0.03 0.14 
Future Thought 0.36 (0.58) 1.36 (0.79) 0.36 (0.58) 14.90 2, 42 .001 0.42 
Note: Not all participants reported all types of thought (past, present, future) with cue words 
as the trigger. Because of this, 5 participants were removed from the analysis of past 
memories (N=31), 12 participants were removed from the analysis of current thoughts 
(N=24), and 14 participants were removed from the analysis of future thoughts (N=22).   
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Table 7 
Mean Ratings of Pleasantness, Vividness, Rehearsal (Standard Deviation), and Mean  
Proportions of Specific Thoughts as a Function of Type of Thought (Past vs. Present vs.  
Future) and Group (Dysphoric vs. Non-Dysphoric). The Results of Independent Samples T- 
tests for each Temporality of Thought are Reported in the Right Hand Columns.  
  Dysphoric Non-Dysphoric t df 1 p 
Pleasantness  
Past Memory 
 
     2.66 (0.96) 
 
3.51 (0.84) 
 
-2.77 
 
32 
 
0.009 
 Current 2.70 (1.18) 3.06 (0.67) -1.06 23.8 0.3 
 Future Thought 3.16 (1.35) 3.76 (0.55) -1.53 17.56 0.14 
Vividness       
 Past Memory 5.28 (0.76) 4.76 (1.38) 1.39 27.13 0.18 
 Current 4.43 (1.39) 4.33 (1.69) 0.17 30 0.86 
 Future Thought 5.10 (1.12) 4.91 (1.55) 0.37 25 0.71 
Rehearsal       
 Past Memory 3.27 (1.01) 2.65 (0.84) 1.95 32 0.06 
 Current 3.28 (1.26) 2.60 (1.16) 1.57 30 0.13 
 Future Thought 3.10 (1.05) 3.23 (0.98) - 0.32 25 0.75 
Specificity       
 Past Memory 46.46 (32.81) 57.72 (35.15) - 0.96 32 0.34 
 Current 36.46 (45.53) 61.14 (32.02) - 1.77 30 0.09 
 Future Thought 43.81 (41.30) 63.59 (32.71) - 1.37 25 0.18 
 
1Different degrees of freedom for memories, current thoughts and future thoughts reflect the fact that 
not all participants reported all three types of thought. Analyses for memories are based on 16 
dysphoric and 18 non-dysphoric participants; analyses for current thoughts are based on 16 
participants in each group; and analyses for future thoughts are based on 14 dysphoric and 13 non-
dysphoric participants.  
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Table 8 
Frequency (Percentage) of Past Memories and Future Thoughts as a Function of Mood  
Group and Temporal Distance from the Present.  
                                   Dysphoric  Non-Dysphoric 
 < 1 Month < 1 Yr > 1 Yr Total < 1 Month < 1 Yr > 1 Yr Total 
Past 
Memory 
15 (25) 15 (25) 29 (50) 59 
(100) 
 28 (45) 9 (14) 26 (41) 63 
(100) 
Future 
Thought 
20 (65) 6 (19) 5 (16) 31 
(100) 
30 (71) 11 (26) 1 (3) 42 
(100) 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1: Mean Number of Future Thoughts as a Function of Thought Type (Planning vs.   
Daydreaming vs. Upcoming Event) and Group (Dysphoric vs. Non-Dysphoric). Error Bars 
Represent  +1SE. 
  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
